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impropriety of the legal analyses utilized by both courts necessitates
their rejection as a future basis for depriving the directly-sued deposi-
tary bank of the § 3-419(3) defense. It should be solely within the
prerogative of the state legislatures to determine if serious matters of
public policy demand a return of depositary bank liability to its pre-
UCC status.
BENTON C. TOLLEY, III
THE NEWCOMBE TEST FOR ALLOWING
DEPRECIATION ON A CONVERTED
RESIDENCE-A PROCRUSTEAN RELIANCE ON
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
In a 1941 case, I the Supreme Court denied a deduction to a tax-
payer for reasonable expenses paid in the management of his stocks
and bonds on the ground that such expenses were not incurred "in
carrying on any trade or business."' The following year Congress
responded to the Court's decision by enacting the predecessors of
§ 212(2)3 and § 167(a)(2)4 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
'Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23 read in part:
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Expenses.
(1) Trade or business expenses.
(A) In general. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
3INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212 provides in part:
In the case of an individual there shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year-
(2) for the management, conservation, or mainte-
nance of property held for the production of income . ...
Section 23(a)(2) of the 1939 Code, as amended by the Revenue Ace of 1942, ch. 619,
§ 121, 56 Stat. 121, contained virtually identical language.
The deduction for expenses paid or incurred in connection with property held for
the production of income has been commonly referred to as one for non-trade or non-
business expenses. 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.01 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as MERTENS]. To be distinguished are actual trade or business
expenses which are deductible pursuant to § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
INTr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167 reads in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-There shall be allowed as a depreciation
NOTES AND COMMENTS
These sections allow deductions for reasonable expenses5 and, in ap-
propriate cases, for depreciation,' incurred in connection with invest-
ment property "held for the production of income." While the admin-
istrative interpretation of the requirement that property be held for
the production of income is outlined in the Treasury Regulations
accompanying § 212(2),' problems have arisen in applying this re-
quirement to property which has been abandoned as a residence and
subsequently held for sale.' Specifically, the question of what consti-
tutes an effective "conversion" ' of former residential property to
property held for the production of income has been a source of fre-
quent but inconclusive litigation.'" This lack of judicial guidance has
deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-
(2) of property held for the production of income.
Section 23(l)(2) of the 1939 Code, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619,
§ 121, 56 Stat. 121, contained virtually identical language.
5Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f)-(o) (1957) elaborates on the types of expenditures al-
lowed to be deducted pursuant to § 212. Among the expenses qualifying for deductions
are those relating to maintenance. However, capital expenditures are never permitted
to be deducted from gross income by the taxpayer. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 263;
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(n) (1957). The distinction between maintenance and capital
expenditures can be tenuous at times. See, e.g., Midland Empire Packing Co., 14T.C.
635 (1950).
6It may be asserted that depreciation is theoretically an expense of production and
should be deductible under § 212 or § 162, which also provides for expense deductions.
See note 3 supra and note 45 infra. However, the fact that the tax laws have always
utilized separate provisions for deducting depreciation and other types of expenses
would seem to dictate otherwise. In addition, the rule of narrow construction which is
applied to a provision allowing a deduction would support the conclusion that depre-
ciation is deductible only under § 167. See note 33 infra.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957) specifies:
The term "income" for the purpose of section 212 includes not
merely income of the taxable year but also income which the taxpayer
has realized in a prior taxable year or may realize in subsequent years;
and is not confined to recurring income but applied as well to gains
from the disposition of property.
The same explanation of what constitutes "income" is found in the committee reports
to the legislation enacting § 23(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the prede-
cessor of § 212 of the 1954 Code. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942);
S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1942).
RIt has long been recognized that property which is dedicated to rental use is
property held for the production of income. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957).
9The courts have generally referred to the change from personal use to property
held for the production of income as a "conversion." E.g., Frank A. Newcombe, 54 T.C.
1298, 1302 (1970); Mary L. Robinson, 2 T.C. 305, 308 (1943).
"E.g., Frank A. Newcombe, 54 T.C. 1298 (1970); Warren Leslie, Sr., 6 T.C. 488
(1951); Mary L. Robinson 2 T.C. 305 (1943). See also cases cited in 2 CCH 1974 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 2006.37.
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caused much uncertainty for a taxpayer in gauging the tax conse-
quences of an alleged conversion, particularly as to what expense
deductions are permitted because of his change in the use of the
property."
The present uncertainty surrounding the tax consequences of an
alleged conversion of residential property to property held for the
production of income is due in large part to the vacillation demon-
strated by the Tax Court in deciding cases in this area. 12 Shortly after
enactment of the sections allowing expense and depreciation
deductions for investment property, the Tax Court determined in
Mary L. Robinson'3 that abandonment of a residence and offering it
for sale or rent was sufficient to convert the property to income pro-
ducing uses. In Warren Leslie, Sr.," however, the Tax Court modified
its Robinson test and held that a bona fide offer to rent the property
was a prerequisite to conversion of the property to investment use.
Following some nineteen years of adherence to the modified Robinson
test,'5 the Tax Court announced a new standard for conversion in the
"The uncertainty in this area was highlighted by the recent pronouncement of the
Internal Revenue Service that it will litigate, rather than settle or compromise, the
issue of whether a taxpayer who abandons residential property and offers it for sale is
entitled to a deduction for depreciation or maintenance expenses during the period
prior to the time the property is sold. INT. REv. MANUAL (MT 1277-6, Jan. 1, 1973).
12As early as 1928, the Supreme Court recognized that former residential property
could be abandoned as a residence and dedicated to income-related uses in Heiner v.
Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928). The Court held that the change in use of a former resi-
dence qualified as a transaction entered into for profit so that a loss deduction was
appropriate under § 214 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1918, the predecessor of § 165
of the 1954 Code. The Court stated that "the purpose to use the property as a residence
of the taxpayer came to an end when it was leased in 1901, and from that date until it
was sold nineteen years later it was devoted exclusively to the production of a profit
in the form of net rentals." Id. at 584-85.
132 T.C. 305 (1943).
"6 T.C. 488 (1951).
"5E.g., Jones v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1968) (good faith offer to
rent sufficient for conversion); Gertrude B. Casey, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1558 (1965)
(no proof of offer to rent and therefore no conversion).
It should be noted that the Tax Court in 1967 appeared to revise the standard used
to determine whether a valid conversion had occurred. In the case of Hulet P. Smith,
26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 149 (1967), aff'd per curiam, 397 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1968), the
Tax Court retreated from its requirement that abandoned residential property must
be offered for rent in order to effect a valid conversion. The court recognized that mere
abandonment and listing for sale might be sufficient to convert former residential
property to property held for the production of income where valid economic considera-
tions dictated against the rental of the property. The Smith case, however, has been
confined to its fact situation as noted in Lewis v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
855, 858 (S.D. Ohio 1973), wherein the court stated: "[tihe case of Smith v. United
NOTES AND COMMENTS
1970 decision Frank A. Newcombe.'6
In the Newcombe case, the Tax Court abandoned its requirement
that former residential property had to be rented or offered for rent
in order to effect a valid conversion. 7 The court stated, however, that
in the absence of a bona fide offer to rent the property, an abandoned
residence had to be held with the expectation of gain upon disposi-
tion.'8 The Newcombe court defined its gain requirement to mean
that the property had to be held with the expectation of realizing
upon sale both post-conversion appreciation and an amount in excess
of the taxpayer's original investment in the property. 9
The Newcombe court based the first requirement, that the prop-
erty be held for post-conversion appreciation, on the Supreme Court
case of Heiner v. Tindle.1' Heiner was read to support the Tax Court's
proposition that "where the profit represents only the appreciation
which took place during the period of occupancy as a personal resi-
dence, it cannot be said that the property was 'held for the production
of income'."12 ' The court reasoned that the abandoned residence must
be held for appreciation following the alleged conversion in order to
constitute a holding of property for the production of income.22 This
States. . . has been limited to its facts by the Tax Court in subsequent decisions and
is now regarded as having little precedential value."
'654 T.C. 1298 (1970).
'"The Newcombe court- stated that "[olffers to rent are an important element in
the taxpayer's favor. . . .We are not inclined however, to accept respondent's position
that the presence or absence of rental offers should be the focal point." Id. at 1300-01.
"Id. at 1301-02. The Newcombe court relied upon the committee reports, cited at
note 7 supra, to the 1942 legislation allowing a deduction for expenses paid or incurred
in connection with investment property. These reports specify that income is not
confined to recurring income and should be equated with the concept of gain. The same
explanation of what is meant by income for purposes of the requirement that property
be held for the production of income is found inTreas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957), quoted
in part at note 7 supra.
' The test promulgated by the Newcombe court loosely referred to both the tax-
payer's investment in the property and his tax cost. Presumably the Tax Court was
referring to the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property since that is the important
factor in determining whether the taxpayer realizes gain or loss upon disposition. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001(a), 1011(a). The original basis of a residence may, of
course, differ from its adjusted basis. See note 29 infra.
-276 U.S. 582 (1928). In Heiner the Supreme Court first recognized that residen-
tial property could be abandoned and dedicated to income-related uses so as to qalify
for a different tax treatment than it did when it was used as a residence. See note 12
supra.
2254 T.C. at 1302.
'In setting forth the requirement that property be held for post-conversion appre-
ciation, the court recognized that merely asking a price in excess of the fair market
value of the property at the time of the alleged conversion might not be sufficient to
1974]
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reading of Heiner appears sound and finds support in the regula-
tions." Consequently, it is not surprising that the requirement of
post-conversion appreciation has been followed without question in
subsequent cases dealing with the conversion issue in a non-rental
context.
2
The second requirement introduced by the Newcombe court, that
the property be held for an amount in excess of the taxpayer's original
investment in the property,25 was based on the committee reports
accompanying the predecessor of § 212(2) of the 1954 Code.26 Accord-
ing to those reports, the term "income" was equated with the term
"gain. ' 27 The court apparently reasoned that since gain from dealings
in property is included in § 61 of the present Code's definition of
constitute holding the property for post-conversion appreciation. According to the
Newcombe court, the taxpayer must also establish that such an asking price is not
merely a "bargaining stance." Id. This refinement is reflected in the Tax Court deci-
sion of Charles D. Mayes, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 363, 365 (1971), where the court
stated:
As was said in Newcombe, supra, we must take account of the fact
that the listed price is often a bargaining stance. . . .The process of
decreasing the price continued until the property was finally sold for
$20,500 on May 15, 1967. This indicates the petitioners were not hold-
ing the property to realize any appreciation accruing subsequent to
their moving out, but rather were simply trying to realize as much as
possible on its sale.
In determining whether an asking price is merely a bargaining stance, both the
Newcombe and Mayes courts recognized that the existence or nonexistence of subse-
quent offers to buy and sell was a critical factor to be examined by the court. This
judicial inquiry into events subsequent to the alleged conversion to determine the true
intent of the taxpayer at the time of abandoning the residence represents the courts'
use of hindsight. Such hindsight would appear to be a substantial barrier to obtaining
deductions for the taxpayer who, after holding the property for post-conversion appre-
ciation within the meaning of Newcombe, changes his mind and rededicates the prop-
erty to personal use.
23See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(h) (1957), which prohibits any deduction for reasona-
ble expenses while property is used as a residence. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 262; Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (specifying that expenses of maintaining a house-
hold are non-deductible). Consistency would appear to require that any attempt to
realize only appreciation occurring during dedication to personal usage would fail to
satisfy the production of income requirement of § 212.
21E.g., Lewis v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 855 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Richard R. Riss, Sr., 56 T.C. 388 (1971); Charles D. Mayes, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
363 (1971); Richard N. Newbre, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 705 (1971).
nSee note 23 supra.
26H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 87 (1942).
2H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 133 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 87, 145 (1942). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957), quoted in part
at note 7 supra.
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gross income,2 and since the rule for computing gain on the sale of a
residence will generally be the excess of the amount realized over the
taxpayer's original investment,29 the property must be held for an
amount in excess of that investment in order to be held for the pro-
duction of income.30 This statutory analysis is defensible since the
court merely followed basic rules of construction in attempting to
interpret the congressional intent behind § 212(2). The court used
the standard extrinsic aids of similar statutes3 ' and committee re-
ports to resolve a problem of ambiguity,32 and then applied the well-
recognized rule of narrow construction in construing a statute provid-
ing for a deduction.3 The requirement that the property be held for
-IINr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(3).
"Section 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code specifies that the computation for
determining gain or loss on the disposition of property is the amount realized less the
adjusted basis. Section 1016 of the Code specifies the various adjustments to be made
in computing the adjusted basis. The Newcombe requirement that the property be
held for an amount in excess of cost will generally comply with the statutory scheme,
since in most cases the adjusted basis of the property will be the same as the taxpayer's
cost. However, it is possible that the adjusted basis of the property will be different
from its cost, as where a capital expenditure is made in connection with the property
or a special assessment is paid by the taxpayer. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1016.
In such a case it would appear that the Newcombe standard would require that the
property be held for an amount in excess of adjusted basis. See note 23 supra.
'The concurring opinions in Newcombe criticized the majority's position as being
.,excessive" in that it precludes any tax benefits to a taxpayer who is attempting to
minimize his loss when it is apparent that the property will appreciate in value follow-
ing abandonment. 54 T.C. at 1304 (Forrester, J., concurring); 54 T.C. at 1303 (Dren-
nen, J., concurring). For example, if a taxpayer purchases a residence in year 1 for
$100,000, and decides to convert it to property held for the production of income at
the end of year 3 when the fair market value is $50,000, the taxpayer will be unable to
satisfy the majority's test in Newcombe unless the property is placed on the market
for a sales price in excess of $100,000. The taxpayer is thus precluded from any tax
benefits if he attempts to minimize his loss by setting a sales price for the property of
$65,000, even though the sales price reflects an expectation of substantial appreciation
over converson value. While such criticism is not without merit, it should be directed
to Congress in changing the wording of the statutes.
3 The Newcombe court's analysis can be criticized in that it uses § 61(a)(3) of the
Code to serve as an aid in construing the meaning of a statute enacted some twelve
years earlier. This argument loses force, however, when it is realized that the predeces-
sor of § 61(a)(3) contained virtually identical language.
"See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03 (4th ed. 1970).
The use of committee reports has long been recognized as a source for determining the
intent of Congress in enacting legislation. Id. at § 48.06. It also has been recognized
that "other statutes on the subject, previous to or contemporary with the enactment
of the statute being construed may also be helpful." Id. at § 48.03. Additionally, the
courts may combine these different kinds of extrinsic aids to reach a "composite
judgment as to intent or meaning." Id.
331 MERTENS § 3.08; 4A MERTENS § 25.03. This rule is based on the proposition
1974]
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an amount in excess of the taxpayer's investment in the property has
also been consistently employed in post-Newcombe cases as a factor
in determining whether residential property has been converted to
income producing purposes. 4
However, the two-pronged conversion test promulgated by the
Tax Court in Newcombe for determining whether the alleged conver-
sion of a residence satisfies the statutory requirement that property
be held for the production of income settles only that issue. The
determination of effective conversion 35 fails either to address or an-
swer the question of whether all expense deductions, and in particular
depreciation, automatically follow. Although the post-Newcombe
cases did not deal specifically with this question," a majority of the
decisions before Newcombe did answer the question affirmatively in
confining their inquiry solely to whether the abandoned residence has
been converted. 7 While such an approach seems sound when the
courts are confronted with the question of whether reasonable38 man-
that deductions are a matter of legislative grace. It should be emphasized, however,
that the rule "should not be applied to costs inherent in the production of income and
for which deductions are required by fundamental law." Id. at § 3.08. The qualifica-
tion to the rule rests on the sometimes tenuous distinction between income, which can
be taxed without apportionment under the sixteenth amendment, and capital, which
can be taxed only if the tax is apportioned among the states. See note 42 infra and
cases cited therein.
31E.g., Lewis v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 855 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Charles D. Mayes, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 363 (1971); Richard N. Newbre, 30 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 705 (1971).
*The requirement that the property be held for the production of income is found
in both § 212(2) and § 167(a)(2). The committee reports and the regulations accompa-
nying § 212, interpreting what is meant by "property held for the production of in-
come," refer exclusively to § 212(2). Despite this latter fact the courts have consis-
tently held that the requirement that property be held for the production of income is
to be construed as meaning the same in § 167(a)(2) as it does in § 212(2). E.g., George
W. Mitchell, 47 T.C. 120, 128-29 (1966); Mary L. Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943). This
conclusion appears sound since the language of the two sections is identical and was
added at the same time and for the same reason. See text accompanying notes 1-6
supra.
36The cases following Newcombe have not dealt explicitly with whether deprecia-
tion deductions automatically follow once residential property is deemed converted.
However, one Tax Court decision states in dictum that other factors besides the con-
version issue have to be considered in determining whether a depreciation deduction
is proper. Richard N. Newbre, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 705, 707 (1971).
37E.g., Hulet P. Smith, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 149 (1967), aff'd per curiam, 397
F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1968); Mary L. Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943). It should be noted that
the pre-Newcombe cases, with the exception of Smith, were for the most part operating
under some kind of rental requirement. See note 47 infra.
"Section 212 of the 1954 Code specifically requires that all expenses must be
ordinary and necessary in order to be deductible. The Supreme Court has interpreted
NOTES AND COMMENTS
agement and maintenance expenses39 are deductible pursuant to
§ 212(2)," ° the same approach is too narrow an inquiry when the
courts are considering the appropriateness of a deduction for depre-
6iation under § 167(a)(2).
A threshold consideration in determining whether a depreciation
deduction is proper pursuant to § 167 is the question of whether the
property itself is depreciable." While one requirement for an asset to
be depreciable is that it be property held for the production of in-
come, if it is not used in a trade or business, several other criteria are
also applicable. One essential criterion would seem to be that the
deduction satisfy any requirements consistent with the purpose of the
section providing for a depreciation deduction. 2 A discussion of these
requirements necessarily involves a determination of the function of
the depreciation deduction.
The purpose of the depreciation allowance under § 167 has been
described in various ways. 3 One description is that the deduction
this requirement to mean that the expenses must be reasonable in amount and bear a
proximate relation to the management of the property held for the production of
income. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 370 (1945).
"As to the kinds of expenses permitted to be deducted under § 212, see note 5
supra.
"0When the expenses are deemed to be reasonable they automatically fulfill the
statutory requirement that the expenses be ordinary and necessary. Trust of Bingham
v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 370 (1945). It has also been indicated that when the
expenses are ordinary and necessary, the deduction conforms to the purpose of the
statute in light of its legislative history. See id. Thus, once it is determined that
property is held for the production of income, the judicial practice of allowing a deduc-
tion for reasonable upkeep expenses appears sound.
"Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1966);
4 MERTENS § 23.01. See also Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961).
12See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.06 (4th ed. 1973);
Note, 45 TEXAS L. Rxv. 1251, 1254-55 (1967). The narrow rule of construction applica-
ble to provisions allowing a deduction from gross income would appear to reinforce the
conclusion that the depreciation deduction should be read in light of the underlying
purpose for the deduction. This rule of construction is founded on the proposition that
deductions are a matter of legislative grace. See note 6 supra. The rule of narrow
construction has been specifically recognized as applicable to deductions for deprecia-
tion under § 167. Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961); Jefferson
& Clearfield Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 918, 920 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936); 1 MERTENS § 3.08; 4A MERTENS § 25.03; 4 MERTENS
§ 23.01. However, the narrow rule of construction was said to be inapplicable to a
depreciation provision in Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 704 (1937), where it was asserted that depreciation deductions are a matter
of fundamental right in arriving at the concept of income.
'E.g., Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958) (to spread the deprecia-
tion cost ratably over the useful life of the property); Detroit Edison Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 131 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1942) (to create a fund to restore the property to the
1974]
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serves to recoup that part of "capital"44 estimated to have been used
up in currently producing income. 5 This description, however, does
not seem to answer the question of whether capital has to be currently
productive of income, or at least be expected to produce current
income, in order that a deduction for depreciation comply with the
purpose of § 167. The decisions appear to be somewhat unclear on
extent of the taxpayer's investment at the end of its useful life). See generally 4
MERTENS § 23.04.
"The term "capital" as used in this article is best described as follows:
Capital, in either of two senses, as financial amounts or as physi-
cal facilities, can be thought of as a stock of wealth. It yields a flow of
benefits over time, dollar receipts or products and services. The
flow-a stated amount for each period of time, perhaps regular, per-
haps significantly irregular-is income. TAX FOUNDATION, INC., DEPRE-
CIATION ALLOWANCES: FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND SOME ECONOMIC
ASPECTS 9 (1970).
"5See Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 276
(1966); United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1927); See also
Note, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1251, 1254-55 (1967).
A preliminary consideration to determining the purpose underly-
ing the statutory depreciation deduction is the meaning to be attrib-
uted to the concept of depreciation. AS pointed out by Professor Bon-
bright in his noted book, Valuation of Property, the meanings at-
tached to the word depreciation are variants of four basic concepts.
These are: (1) decrease in value; (2) amortized cost; (3) difference in
value between an existing old asset and a hypothetical new asset taken
as a standard of comparison; and (4) impaired serviceableness. 1 J.
BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY, 183-87 (1937). The generally ac-
cepted accounting concept is that of amortized cost, which is well-
described in Accounting Terminology Bulletin, No. 1 of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants as follows:
Depreciation accounting is a system of accounting which aims to
distribute the cost or other basic value of tangible capital assets, less
salvage (if any), over the estimated useful life of the unit (which may
be a group of assets) in a systematic and rational manner. It is a
process of allocation, not of valuation. Depreciation for the year is the
portion of the total charge under such a system that is allocated to the
year. Although the allocation may properly take into account occurr-
ences during the year, it is not intended to be a measurement of the
effect of all such occurrences.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AND TER-
MINOLOGY BULLETINS-FINAL EDITION (1961). This concept is the same basic approach
adopted by the Internal Revenue Code. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (1957), which
states in part:
The [depreciation] allowance is that amount which should be set
aside for the taxable year in accordance with a reasonably consistent
plan (not necessarily at a uniform rate), so that the aggregate of the
amounts set aside, plus the salvage value, will, at the end of the
estimated useful life of the depreciable property, equal the cost or
NOTES AND COMMENTS
this matter,46 and the approach of the pre-Newcombe cases in allow-
ing a deduction for depreciation in connection with an abandoned
residence merely because it is held for the production of income does
not squarely face the issue." Examining the depreciation deduction
in light of the underlying scheme of the federal income tax, however,
suggests that current production of income, or at least the likelihood
of such income, is a necessary factor in complying with the purpose
of § 167 of the Code.
The underlying scheme of the federal income tax has been charac-
terized as an attempt to tax net earnings-gross income less costs of
each particular year. 8 In connection with businesses, Congress allows
certain deductions to be claimed in accomplishing this objective.
These include costs of materials, wages and salaries, rents, interest,
advertising, incidental repairs and maintenance, and other operating
expenses incurred in producing revenues.49 Similar deductions are
permitted in connection with property held for the production of
income,5" thereby achieving the general goal of taxing net income for
both business and investment property.
Since a requirement as to the existence of currently earned income
is not clear from examination of the purpose of the depreciation de-
other basis of the property as provided in section 167(g) and
§ 1.167(g)-1.
See also Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 277 (1966); E. GRANT
& P. NORTON, JR., DEPRECIATION 13 (1955). Any differences between the accounting and
tax approaches to depreciation are largely due to the method of allocation and not to
the underlying theory.
"It is apparent, however, that the courts have focused their attention on the
statutory requirements for a depreciation deduction, and not on the underlying theory
of the statute.
"The majority of the pre-Newcombe cases did not have to consider the question
of whether property which was not productive of current income was depreciable. Their
requirement that the property be rented or held for rent in good faith in order to be
deemed property held for the production of income settled both the conversion ques-
tion and the corresponding depreciable property issue, since property deducated to
rental use was at least expected to produce current income. E.g., Warren Leslie, Sr., 6
T.C. 488 (1951). The case of Hulet P. Smith, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 149 (1967), aff'd
per curiam, 397 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1968), however, would not fall in this category. In
Smith the question of whether the property had to be currently productive of income
was apparently never in issue and consequently was summarily bypassed by the Tax
Court. For a discussion of the Smith case, see note 15 supra.
"See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Davis
v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 704 (1937); 1 MERTENS
§ 5.10; TAx FOUNDATION INC., DEPRECIATION ALLowANcEs: FEDERAL TAX POUCY AND
SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS 8 (1970).
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162. See note 3 supra.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 212. See note 3 supra.
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duction, seemingly the general objective of the federal income tax,
i.e., the taxing of net income, should control. Consequently, when
some portion of a taxpayer's gross income is attributable to capital
estimated to have been consumed in producing income, a deduction
for depreciation is proper. Any part of the taxpayer's gross income
resulting from a consumption of capital is not net income, but is in
fact income plus an amount equal to the cost of the capital used up
in producing that income1.5 The objective of taxing net income is thus
accomplished by matching the estimated cost of capital consumed
against the gross income produced for that period.
Several other examples will illustrate the relationship between the
allowance of a deduction for capital consumed, or depreciation, to
achieve the goal of taxing net income and the necessity of a require-
ment that current income be produced. First, where there is no con-
sumption of capital, a depreciation deduction should not be permit-
ted, because all the income produced is net income.2 Similarly, when
the taxpayer receives no income, unless the capital has been dedi-
cated to the production of current income,53 a depreciation deduction
seems also inappropriate, since there is neither gross nor net income.
Finally, even if the taxpayer is presently receiving income from some
sources of capital and no income from another source of capital, no
depreciation deduction is proper for the nonproductive source of
capital. No part of the income the taxpayer is presently receiving is
attributable to consumption of the non-productive item of capital,
although it should be acknowledged that the non-productive asset
may be adversely affected in some manner unrelated to the produc-
tion of the taxpayer's income. 4 Most importantly, it should be noted
that all the income subject to tax will be net income, since all appro-
priate deductions will have been allowed for the capital consumed
5'This analysis is consistent with the concept of capital and income as outlined in
note 44 supra. The flow attributed to the use of the capital in a productive enterprise
is generally income. However, "part of each year's flow can be thought of, not as net
product, but as offsetting some of the cost of creating the facility and therefore as
restoring or rebuilding what capital was used up." TAX FOUNDATION INC., DEPRECIATION
ALLOWANCES: FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTs 8 (1970).
2This is merely a way of saying that there has been no exhaustion, wear and tear,
or obsolescence as required by § 167 for a depreciation deduction. See note 65 infra.
-For a discussion of this exception, see text accompanying note 62-63 infra.
SThe fact that capital may be thought of as depreciating even though not related
to the production of income is due in large part to the confusion as to what is meant
by the concept of depreciation. While capital may decrease in value or be impaired in
its serviceableness and said to be depreciating in those senses, it would not necessarily
be depreciable as used in the accounting or the federal income tax sense. See note 45
supra.
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in producing the taxpayer's other current income. Thus, the objective
of the underlying scheme of the federal income tax is accomplished
without a depreciation deduction for a non-productive item of capi-
tal.55 Allowance of a depreciation deduction would go beyond the
federal scheme of taxing net income and would appear to be beyond
the purpose of the provision authorizing a depreciation deduction. 6
Applying these principles to an abandoned residence which is not
rented or offered for rent and therefore not currently producing in-
come, a depreciation deduction appears unwarranted. No part of the
taxpayer's other current income is attributable to the physical
exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence of the abandoned residen-
tial property which is being held for appreciation. The scheme of
taxing net income is accomplished without the need for a deprecia-
tion deduction in connection with the converted residence.', Rather,
The question of whether a depreciation deduction should be permitted for an
asset which is not currently producing income can be viewed in light of the method of
accounting which the courts have adopted with regard to these assets. Specifically, the
Supreme Court has used two different types of accounting for income tax purposes:
the annual accounting approach and the transactional theory of taxable income. See,
e.g., Burnet v. Sanford & Brooke Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) (annual); Bowers v.
Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926) (transactional). See also Gray, The Su-
preme Court, Accounting, and the Tax Accrual of "True" Income, 28 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1, 40-42 (1971). Under the annual accounting approach, the court looks merely
to the particular year in question to determine the income tax consequences of that
particular year. Under the transactional approach, the court examines the entire trans-
action before deciding what the various tax consequences are for each year. Applying
these principles to the converted residence situation, the courts have opted, in allowing
depreciation deductions each year for capital not held for the current production of
income, for the annual approach. However, it would appear that if the objective of the
accounting method is to tax net income for a single accounting period, a transactional
approach would seem more appropriate. Otherwise the tax for any single accounting
period in which a deduction is allowed for non-productive capital would be based on
an amount less than the actual net income of that particular period. The transactional
approach would also be consistent with the policy of permitting capital gains treat-
ment for gains on the sale of assets which have appreciated in value over more than a
single accounting period. See note 60 infra.
"Commentators have frequently observed that depreciation serves as a way of
controlling economic growth by affecting the rate of investment. E.g., Hall & Jorgeson,
Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, 42 AMER. EcON. REv. 392 (1967); Keith,
Importance of the Depreciation Deduction to the Economy, 40 TAXEs 163 (1962). Thus,
it might be argued that if a depreciation deduction for an abandoned residence furthers
the purpose of controlling economic growth,, such a deduction would be proper even
under any rule of narrow construction. This argument loses much of its force, however,
when it is realized that the relationship of the depreciation allowances to economic
policy is found in the manner and timing of the allocation and is no way linked to the
threshold question of defining what property is depreciable.
57The depreciation deducation should not be a mere anticipation of a problem of
loss which is governed by § 165 of the Code. Allowing a deduction for depreciation
1974]
710 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
recognition of any decrease of value in the property during the sale
period should await an actual sale or disposition, or as the regulations
and courts term, until the transaction is "closed." 8
This conclusion that a depreciation deduction should not be per-
mitted in connection with abandoned residential property which is
not rented or offered for rent is further supported by the fact that
such a deduction would enable the taxpayer to "trade off' ordinary
income for capital gains income. Since the taxpayer has no recurring
ordinary income from the property against which the depreciation
deduction is matched, the deduction will serve to reduce the tax-
payer's ordinary income from other sources. If the taxpayer sells the
former residential property for a gain, however, the gain should have
the character of capital gain and be taxable at the lower capital gains
rate. 9 Therefore, if the taxpayer is permitted a depreciation deduc-
tion, he will be able to use converted residential property as a means
of reducing his total tax liability. Not only does this violate the con-
gressional policy against use of a depreciation deduction to trade
ordinary income for capital gains income, as expressed by the enact-
where there is no recurring income merely has the effect of anticipating loss on a final
sale, and more importantly avoiding the requirements for a loss deduction which are
specified in § 165. One of the principal requirements which § 165 specifies in order
for a loss deduction to be proper is that it must involve a "transaction entered into for
profit." The courts have consistently held that the requirement that the property be
employed in a transaction entered into for profit is much narrower than the require-
ment that the property be held for the production of income. E.g., Rumsey v. Commis-
sioner, 82 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 552 (1936); Morgan v. Commis-
sioner, 76 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 601 (1935). Both cases hold that
abandonment and listing for sale or rent are not sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of a transaction entered into for profit.
8Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1960) specifies: "To be allowable as a deduction under
section 165(a), a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions .... "
Similarly, the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of a "closed" transaction in
Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931), where the Court, citing Lucas v. American
Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930) stated: "Generally speaking, the income tax law is
concerned only with realized losses, as with realized gains."
'Irrw. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201, 1221. It is conceivable, however, that a court
would refuse to allow capital gains treatment by analogizing an abandoned residence
which is held for the production of income in the form of post-conversion appreciation
to inventory. Like a can of tomatoes on the grocer's shelf, the abandoned residence is
held by the taxpayer for ultimate sale. There is no intention to use the property for
any purpose other than to realize a profit on the future sale. Thus, by applying the
doctrine enunciated in Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52
(1955), of interpreting the definition of a capital asset narrowly and its exclusions
broadly, the court might deem the abandoned residence an inventory asset. This
characterization would preclude capital gains treatment, since inventory is excluded
from the definition of a capital asset. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221(1),
1231(b)(1)(A).
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ment of § 1245 and § 1250,0 but also it encourages the non-use of
housing at a time when the supply is still not sufficient to meet the
rising demand.6
The conclusion that property must be currently producing income
in order to qualify for a deduction for depreciation does not mean that
property which is offered for rent but which is not actually rented, or
property which has been rented in the past, but which is currently
not producing income due to unrelated economic factors, would also
be non-depreciable. These two situations involve property which at
least has been dedicated to the current production of recurring in-
come. Where the property has been actually rented in the past, the
taxpayer may well be considered engaged in the trade or business of
renting property, 2 and the long recognized "idle asset theory" would
dictate an allowance for depreciation. Under this theory, an asset
which is devoted to the trade or business of the taxpayer is deemed
to be depreciable even though not actively producing recurring in-
come. 3 It would appear logical to extend the "idle asset theory" to
"Section 1245 of the Code provides for the recapture of depreciation by making
any gains on the sale or other disposition of certain depreciable personal property
taxable as ordinary income to the extent of depreciation deductions previously taken.
Section 1250 provides for a similar recapture of the excess of accelerated over straight
line depreciation taken in connection with certain real property.
"See J. FRIED, HousrNG CRISIS U.S.A. 3-21 (1971).
"2The Tax Court has determined that the renting of a single piece of residential
property constitutes carrying on a trade or business. E.g., Stephen J. Hajos, 23 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 2015 (1964); Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372 (1946). Such a finding would
preclude the taxpayer from any claim that the converted residence is a capital asset
under § 1221 and would force him to rely upon § 1231 to obtain any capital gains
treatment. The Second Circuit, however, has reached a contradictory result on the
trade or business issue. Grier v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), aff'd
per curiam, 218 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955). The Grier decision has been favorably recieved
by at least one commentator, as shown by the following excerpt:
Some clue as to whether or not the drafters of the Code intended
the renting of a single property to be a trade or business might be
found in Sec. [1162. This statute defines "adjusted gross income" as
the figure upon which deductions are based .... The Code lists
various categories of deductions to be taken in arriving at adjusted
gross income. One of these is deductions attributable to a trade or
business; another is deductions attributable to property held for the
production of rents. But if renting is in every case a trade or business,
it would not have been necessary to enumerate both classes of deduc-
tions. Both classes could then have combined as one-trade or busi-
ness deductions. The fact that the Code sets up two separate classes
might warrant the conclusion that the renting of a single property is
not in every case a trade or business.
6 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 4729.51.
61See P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1946); Kittredge
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abandoned residential property which is held for the production of
recurring income, even though the property is not currently produc-
ing income. As in the situation where an idle asset has been dedicated
to use in a trade or business and maintained in usable condition so
that it will be ready for use should the occasion arise, an abandoned
residence which is offered for rent in good faith should be allowed a
depreciation deduction if it otherwise qualifies. Any extension of the
"idle asset theory" to converted residential property which is not
offered for rent, however, would not appear to be warranted, since in
a non-rental context a depreciation deduction bears no relation to the
production of the taxpayer's net income for the particular tax year
involved.
In addition to the requirement that property be held for the pro-
duction of income and the requirements relating to the purpose of the
depreciation provision, there are two other criteria which must be
considered in determining whether a depreciation deduction is proper
in the converted residence situation. One of these is that the property
must have a useful life over which to allocate the depreciation." The
other is that the property must be subject to exhaustion, wear and
tear, or obsolescence." Neither of these requirements is satisfied in
the case of an abandoned residence merely because property is held
for the production of income.
Specifically, the depreciation provision requires that depreciation
be allocated over the useful life of the property in question.6 The
regulations under § 167 define "useful life" as the period of time over
which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the tax-
payer in the production of income; this period is not necessarily the
useful life inherent in the asset." Following this definition, a resi-
dence converted under the Newcombe test does not appear to have
the reasonable ascertainable useful life required by the depreciation
provision.
At least three problems arise in applying the useful life definition
where the taxpayer is holding an abandoned residence in expectation
of realizing both post-conversion appreciation and an amount in ex-
cess of his investment in the property. First, it cannot be claimed that
the converted residence was expected to be useful in producing in-
v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1937); Yellow Cab Co. v. Driscoll, 24 F. Supp.993
(W.D. Pa. 1938). For a recent discussion of the "idle asset theory," see John T. Steen,
61 T.C. 298 (1973).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (1957).
"LNr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a). See note 4 supra.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(d).
'T7reas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(b) (1957).
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come for the taxpayer until the anticipated post-conversion apprecia-
tion is realized on the date of sale. Thus, there is no period of useful
life involved, but only a point in time at which the asset will fulfill
the statutory concept of useful life. Secondly, a useful life based on
the physical life of the property, while being easily ascertainable,
would be improper under the accepted definition of an asset's useful
life. 18 Finally, even if the useful life of the property is deemed to be
the post-conversion period in which the property is expected to appre-
ciate in value, that period is not ascertainable. Reference to trade or
industry experience to determine a property's useful life is of no value
since by definition there is no trade or industry involved. 9 In addi-
tion, any reference to the real estate market to determine the average
length of time required to sell a house would be unreliable, not only
due to varying circumstances, '7 0 but also because more is involved
here than merely selling a house. In particular, the more appropriate
question is the length of time necessary to sell an asset held for the
production of income.
One final consideration dictates against allowing a depreciation
deduction merely because the property is held for the production of
income within the language of the relevant Code sections. Section 167
requires that an asset be subject to exhaustion, wear and tear, or
obsolescence in order to be eligible for a deduction for depreciation.
These factors of deterioration are costs of production representing a
decrease in value of the property involved. It follows logically that if
there is no decrease in value, there is no exhaustion, wear and tear,
or obsolescence as required by the statute in order to qualify for a
depreciation deduction. Under the theory of the Newcombe test,
when a taxpayer asserts that an abandoned residence which is not
rented or offered for rent is held for the production of income, he must
be claiming that the property is being held for both post-conversion
appreciation and an amount in excess of basis." Of necessity, he is
contending that the residence will increase in value during the period
following the alleged conversion. However, in order to satisfy 'the
requirements of § 167 and the regulations thereunder, the taxpayer
must at the same time claim that the property will decrease in value
due to exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence. The taxpayer
should not be permitted to take these two inconsistent positions,
"Id.
"'See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
7
0Such factors as the interest rate, the availability of mortgages, and the time of
year would all influence the time required to sell a house.
"That the Code contemplates a decrease in value in the property is seen in the
language of Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-(1)(a) (1957), quoted at note 44 supra.
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absent unusual circumstances." If he asserts that the converted prop-
erty is held for the production of income, he should be estopped" from
asserting that the property qualifies as a source for depreciation de-
ductions pursuant to § 167.11
In summary of the foregoing analysis, it is readily apparent that
there is a pressing need for a rational approach regarding the conver-
sion issue when the taxpayer is seeking a depreciation deduction for
an abandoned residence. Two alternatives are available in view of the
apparent necessity that a depreciation deduction involve the exist-
ence or expectation of recurring income. First, the courts can aban-
don the Newcombe test for conversion in favor of one requiring at
least a good faith offer to rent 5 the abandoned residence. 7 However,
since a taxpayer may hold a converted residence for the production
of income even when rental of the property is not feasible, it seems
that the Newcombe test should be retained to determine when the
"One situation does exist where the taxpayer can logically claim that residential
property has been converted within the meaning of Newcombe and at the same time
assert that the depreciable portion of the property has depreciated in value. This
situation might occur when the former residence itself is expected to decrease in value
due to exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence, but the land on which the residence
is located is expected to appreciate in value in an amount greater than the house's
decline. The anticipated appreciation of the land must, however, exceed the deprecia-
tion connected with the former residence.
"While all the technical elements of estoppel may not be present, a theory akin
to estoppel, which has been termed the "duty of consistency" or quasi-estoppel has
frequently been recognized. This theory prevents a taxpayer, after taking a position
to his advantage in one year, from shifting to a contrary position touching the same
fact or transaction. Such a theory is representative of the transactional accounting
approach and one which excludes an annual approach. 10 MERTENS § 60.04. See note
55 supra.
"The same conclusion has been reached by examining the regulation's definition
of salvage value, and its requirement that the property never be depreciated below a
reasonable estimated salvage value. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(c)(1) (1957), discussed
in Note, Maintenance and Depreciation Deductions for a Personal Residence Offered
for Sale, 25 TAX. L. REv. 269, 278 (1970).
7 The courts have not explained what is meant by a good faith offer to rent in the
context of an abandoned residence. However, one court has indicated that the "cir-
cumstances existing at the time" of the rental offer will determine whether a rental
offer is made in good faith. James J. Sherlock, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 383, 385 (1972).
In Sherlock the court noted that although the property had been unsuccessfully held
for sale before being offered for rent, and although no rental offers were received by
the taxpayer, the rent sought was reasonable and the taxpayer was amenable to any
reasonable offers. Thus, the court concluded that the rental offer was made in good
faith.
7 Essentially, this position would represent a return to the pre-Newcombe era
when rental attempts were the appropriate touchstone for the courts. See cases cited
at note 15 supra.
